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From March 25-27, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) held its annual assembly in
Argentina. At the conference, attended by more than 4,000 delegates, the IDB directorate reported
on the bank's performance in 1995, which was largely dictated by the Mexican financial crisis that
exploded in late 1994. As a result of the Mexican debacle, the IDB was unable to meet its stated
goal of channeling a much larger share of its funds to the poorer countries in the region since the
financial crunch in Mexico and Argentina sopped up a huge percentage of the bank's available
capital last year.
Nevertheless, the IDB directorate said the Mexican crisis had a positive impact in the region insofar
as it forced all countries to stick to the path of neoliberal reform to avoid similar financial disasters
in the future. At the annual board of governor's assembly in 1994 in Mexico, the IDB adopted a
landmark decision to dramatically redirect much of the bank's scarce resources to the poorest
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, while vastly increasing the amount spent on socialdevelopment programs (see NotiSur, 03/17/94).
In particular, starting in 1995, the IDB was supposed to make sure that, of the total amount loaned
to the 26 member countries in the region, the poorest 19 would receive at least 35% of the bank's
annual assistance, with the region's seven largest economies Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela receiving no more than 65%. If fulfilled, that goal would represent
a substantial concession to the poorer countries since, taken together, they only account for 9% of
regional GDP and only 20% of the total Latin American and Caribbean population. In addition to
the 35%-65% ratio in country loans, the IDB also agreed that, as of 1995, at least 40% of all the money
loaned to the region would be channelled into social- development programs.
At the March annual assembly, however, the IDB directorate reported that the bank fell far short
of those goals in 1995, largely because of the Mexican financial emergency. (For background on the
Mexican crisis and its effect on the rest of Latin America, see NotiSur, 01/12/95, 02/02/95, 02/23/95,
03/16/95 and 05/25/95). Last year, the bank loaned a record total of US$7.303 billion to the region,
representing a whopping 39% increase compared with the US$5.255 billion loaned in 1994. But of the
total, US$2.75 billion nearly 38% was loaned just to Mexico and Argentina to help those countries
avoid economic collapse as a result of the Mexican financial crisis. The huge percentage of bank
resources that was funneled into those two countries greatly reduced the amount available for the 19
poorer countries last year.
Consequently, the share of assistance that actually went to the poorer nations amounted to only 23%
of the total loaned by the IDB last year, about 12 percentage points below the 35% goal. In addition
given that the stabilization loans for Mexico, Argentina, and some other countries absorbed such a
huge portion of the available IDB capital only about 35% of the bank's total loans to the region were
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channeled into social-development programs last year, five percentage points below the 40% goal.
Besides the drain on resources caused by Mexico's crisis, two other factors have greatly contributed
to the inability to channel more resources to the poorer nations.
First, the lion's share of IDB funds are loaned out to member countries with repayment terms that
are usually too stringent for the poorer countries to meet. Second, the amount of money available
in the bank's Special Operations Fund which provides loans on concessionary terms to the poorest
countries in the region is nearly depleted, leaving the poor nations with no other option than to
contract loans on normal terms, which for many is beyond their repayment capability. "The ability
to absorb new debt is limited for the poorer countries," said IDB president Enrique Iglesias. "We
can't lend from our ordinary capital to many of the poor countries because it would be incompatible
with their efforts to manage balance of payments, and since we only have limited concessionary
resources, we often find ourselves paralyzed."
Consequently, the IDB directorate appealed for a vast injection of fresh resources to the Special
Operations Fund, which will run out of money by 1998 if more donations are not made. The fund,
which is capitalized by "extraordinary donations" from the wealthier members of the IDB, has
principally provided loans to the five poorest countries in the hemisphere: Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras,
Guyana, and Nicaragua. The concessionary loans carry low interest rates of between 1% and 4%,
and they include a grace period of between four and ten years plus a 40-year amortization period. Of
the US$1 billion originally available in the Fund, US$770 million has already been loaned out.
In addition to making more concessionary loans available, the IDB directorate also advocates
reinforcing the efficient use of loans to increase the impact of anti-poverty projects and socialdevelopment programs. "Very little is spent on social development in Latin America and much
more needs to be invested," said Iglesias. "But in addition, the little that is spent is invested poorly.
Regarding social investment, the important thing is not how much the IDB can make available in
monetary terms it will always be much less than is needed but rather how a loan can be efficiently
used to produce new strategies in technical cooperation for the poor while fomenting debate over
appropriate social-investment policies.
If the IDB is going to achieve success in social programs, it will not be because of the amount of
money it supplies but rather the contribution the bank makes toward improving the quality of
policies." Among other things, the IDB stresses the importance of spending more on education
throughout the region, and it especially advocates the need for institutional reforms that make
the educational system more effective in preparing people for the labor market. During the IDB
assembly, education ministers from around the region participated in a conference to analyze the
success or failure of current educational reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to a
study by the IDB in 1993, every additional year of schooling that is added to the national educational
average in a given Latin American country will lead to an increase of 0.35% in the GDP per capita
(see NotiSur, 10/21/93).
"The level of spending of education in Latin America and the Caribbean is simply depressing,
and the effectiveness of schooling in the region is light years behind the industrialized world,"
said Iglesias. "Investment in human resources must be a principal component of any government
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economic program. No economic reform can succeed if it sidesteps social problems, especially the
problem of education." Meanwhile, notwithstanding the drain on IDB resources caused by the
Mexican financial debacle, the IDB directorate praised the bank's ability to shore up the Mexican
and Argentine economies during the crisis. "The important thing is that the bank was able to come
to the aid of Argentina and Mexico at a time of great need," said Iglesias.
Moreover, Iglesias and most of the IDB delegates at the assembly agreed that the Mexican
crisis provided invaluable lessons for all countries in the region. According to the IDB, Mexico
demonstrated to other governments the need to maintain strict fiscal and monetary discipline to
avoid a similar financial crisis in their own nations. In fact, some of the delegates which included
finance ministers and central bank presidents from most countries in the region even expressed
admiration for the ability of short-term capital investments in the region to force governments to
stick to neoliberal reforms, even more so than pressures by multilateral lending institutions. "From
the point of view of orthodox neoliberalism, both Mexico and Argentina maintained strict adherence
to adjustment policies last year," said Jacob Frenkel, an Israel official who presided over this year's
board of governor's assembly. "Those countries achieved in just eight months what the region as a
whole took eight years to achieve during the 1980s."
Indeed, the Mexican crisis erupted as a result of the steady withdrawal of portfolio capital
investments in stocks and bonds from Mexico in 1994 in response to the government's poor
handling of the economy and other factors. The sudden, massive withdrawal of capital at the end
of the year and beginning of 1995 led, in effect, to the country's financial collapse, forcing the
government to carry out a severe austerity program, the extent of which was unprecedented in that
country's recent history. A similar situation developed in Argentina, where portfolio investors began
massively withdrawing their capital out of fear that a financial collapse similar to Mexico's was
imminent. In response, the Argentine government also carried out a severe austerity program (see
NotiSur, 09/28/95). Given that greater government controls over such volatile capital investments
have been discarded as an option, the IDB and other multilateral lending institutions argue that all
countries must create stable conditions for investors to avoid the kind of capital flight that gripped
Mexico and Argentina.
In particular, the IDB argues that Latin American and Caribbean countries must tighten their fiscal
policies, make efforts to increase domestic savings, and improve management of capital in the
national banking systems. "Globalization has revealed new challenges," said Iglesias. "Capital
volatility is a phenomenon inherent in globalization, and we are going to have to learn to live with
it." Added Chilean Finance Minister Eduardo Aninat, "Latin American nations will have to learn to
live with financial turbulence and discard the illusion that it can be avoided through government
intervention. We must work to better foresee difficulties and take steps to diminish their effect, but
the development of global capital markets means that the flow of capital into emerging economies
is determined not so much by banking structures as by the conditions that permit liquidity and
profitability."
As governments are forced to adhere to rigid fiscal and monetary policies, however, they will be
hard pressed to offset the effects of austerity on the region's poor. "Poverty, social marginalization,
and unemployment are the big challenges for the future," said Aldo Ferrer, an influential Argentine
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economist who attended the IDB assembly. "If there is not an adequate response to these problems
the difficulties facing the region will increase immensely because growth in the region in effect
depends on domestic demand. About 80% of our output depends on the ability of domestic markets
to absorb what is produced." (Sources: Agence France- Presse, 02/08/96, 02/15/96, 03/20/96, 03/21/96,
03/23-27/96; Inter Press Service, 03/21/96, 03/24/96, 03/25/96, 03/27/96, 03/28/96, 03/30/96, 04/01/96)
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